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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Final Order by the Eighth Judicial District 
Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j)(2008) and § 78A-4-
103(2)(j)(2008). This case involves the timely appeal by Defendant Pipe Renewal 
Service, LLC (herein "PRS LLC") and the timely Cross-Appeal by Plaintiff Ray Hunting 
(or "Ray") from a final order issued on August 6, 2007, by the Honorable John R. 
Anderson, Eighth Judicial District Court Judge. 
A RE-STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
RAY HUNTING 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, PRS LLC 
respectfully disagrees with Ray's statement of the issues and the standards of review 
identified by Ray and therefore restates the issues and provides the appropriate standards 
of review as follows: 
1. Should the Court of Appeals overturn the Trial Court's holding that the 
Plaintiff was not damaged, and arbitrarily award the Plaintiff $264,000.00 in treble 
damages? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review on the damages determination is a 
question of fact and is reviewed under a clear error standard. See Judd ex reL 
Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, f 34, 103 P.3d 135 (recognizing that "damages are a 
question of fact"); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Trial courts are given 
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primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by 
an appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard."). 
2. Did the Trial Court err by requiring the Plaintiff to present evidence 
concerning the reasonableness of requested damages rather than summarily granting the 
Plaintiff all the damages requested? 
Standard of Review; The standard of review on this issue is a clear error standard 
because Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Trial courts are given primary 
responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an 
appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard.'1). 
-2-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Purstmm to Rule 24ibH h -Hh,< I tah Rules of Appellate Procedaie. PRS I T C 
respectfully disagrees v\nh Ra; \s Statement of die ' \\>.e arid tli^iL-forc restates the case as 
follows: 
NA i LIRE OF THE C A S E 
1 his is an appeal in an .vu r • f.-d <k-::imer ajlii^ii from a fiaai juu^meni i. .,n i the 
Eighth Distt let C ourt c f I lintah ( ' 31 11 ity, ! Ital L R ay f 11,11 itit ig si led I 'ipe R enewal Sei v ice, 
LLC for unlawful detainer seeking an eviction of the PRS LLL, and damages. 
1. PRS 1 LC refused to comph with Ra\\ ; ?-da\ m.Cec and unUvfa! detainer 
action ^n thv. 'r i - , ;h:il it.- pght >;;)!,:v , ^ , , C ; H . / : - ..,_• i:- ..: •::'.-> 1. **:, ^ncr *a. n • 7 ^ m 
F . r 7 • ' : • • ' - d i> . ' • • V :• • ' * , • - . - • • -
submitting the lease agreement, signed by Ray, w h^n c\ .denced the lua d;al piuper 
parties were no! \MMJ i yu\ fh;.; ^aLria^ fuds were disputed, R . 25! -27T.. 
T^ie1. e uu.\: .-., .;;/ T r i a l C \-:; - ;, . i*-.- .n ; M I , :\.: , • \ ,•*-*• -M .- ;:•.!*• .-:^ ; ^ 7 ; : , • *iJ-
resei ving the issue of damages for a later hearing. PRS LLC petitioned the com t for 
reconsideration of the evidence presented in opposition to Ray's motion, and for 
clarification of the Court' s 11 il ing. (R 3^1- ' *: K-. P. 4 72 - J •J" '• 
2. A 1 1 ioi ig other tl lii tgs, PR S I I C ai gtied that it had pt csented si lfficiei it 
evidence •: i\\ \h: v.rm ui" die lea^e agreement) to create a material dispute as to whether 
Ray could maintain an action without joining proper parties. (R. 472-495). Two months 
later the court entertained oral arguments on PRS LLC's motions, but nevertheless 
affirmed its earlier ruling. (R. 594-599). Again, the Trial Court did not address the issue 
of damages. Therefore, PRS LLC filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
damages which was ultimately denied. 
3. In the Trial Court's ruling on damages it ruled that "Even if the LLC had 
moved, Mr. Hunting would have had no right to possession of the premises as against the 
corporation. Mr. Hunting, therefore, suffered no actual damages." (R. 819) On this basis 
the Court refused to treble damages. The Trial Court then awarded "unpaid rent", 
apparently as something other than damages. The court's final order, which was not 
accompanied by a separate Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, awarded Ray a 
judgment against PRS LLC in the total sum of $88,174.50, which is calculated as unpaid 
rent from September of 2005 through December of 2006 in the amount of $88,000.00, 
and costs in the amount of $174.50. (R. 840-843). The issue of the eviction of PRS LLC, 
having become moot, was not an issue at the time of the final order. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On September 16, 2005, Ray caused a "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate." 
On October 19, 2005, Ray filed a Complaint against PRS LLC but named it as a Utah 
Corporation. On June 5, 2006, Ray filed an Amended Complaint which made his 
intention clear to sue PRS LLC. 
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On September 2 !, "M;*SK Ra} f;:ed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
November 1, 2006, the Court fntere-: M-* Kuiic;; a:1.*, i ',.. ; . ..;.»ii> iirj.Tiii., ;;»> • 
foi Siiiiiiii,')! v Jnd;jinenl 1 In' < < iint w >n « ci I ihe I-JIC of Kn\ •; damages for a hilure 
hearing. 
On No\ember !4. 2lH)o, PRS I J C filed a Motion to Reconsider the f\>mfs 
November 1st Riding and ; * K V. i'RS I I C argtkv .: M a a..a --ic^emeo. .i.'.iv :•. 
eviii ..< * ••. . c.reei in n it whic :! i ;» - as si ib •'*-•• •:'•'->• • i i \V,JS 
not excluded when submitted as an exhibit to P.RS LLC's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment [R. 251-270, R. ;M0-^4" p to ovate A matena! dispute as to whether 
Ray enidd main- m an';. ! *•.'\\ i;;.* •..: . a? : - rg p r o p e r par*:.- .--? . < o a H 
s „ - . ' « . • • : ' • . • . . . » Rucuiisider on 
Jaiu .:rv .-.), 2007. On i ebr^aiy 1, 200", Lac C ou:t issued KS written Ruling and Order in 
v h k h it deimd PRS I L C \ \hdi.>n K> Reconsider and affirmed the Court's pa ru i 
summary judgment in Hay's lavoras determined in (lie No\ emhci 1, ?UOh,, Kuing jnd 
Order. 
On April 6, 20U7, PRS LLC filed a Motion [iv Samm irv Judgment on (lie I:w:- of 
Damages. The Court issued; ;i~ Rulmg dated Ma; .; i, J--* jv.^mg i'K^ I.M >.• ' »n 
ior Summaij Jiid^nnail on lln i oiir uf damages. * hi ^ 1 P \ 1IN|i"7| R e filed Ins Mnlmn 
t( ) A-.'iirJ Damages and for Entry of Laud Judgment. On Ma ; 1 ,\ 2u07, PRS LLC filed 
Motions to Strike the Affida\ its of Ra> f lunling and Phillip W. Dyer. On July 2, 2007, 
the Court entered its ruling, granting, in part, Ra\ •, Mc^w- .. - \ »V.M\1 Damages aiu; : r 
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Entry of Final Judgment and granting, in part, PRS LLC's Motion to Strike. The Trial 
Court also expressly denied Ray's several requests to have the Trial Court presume and 
declare PRS Corporation's lease abandoned. (R. 820). 
Ray was awarded a judgment against PRS LLC in the total sum of $88,174.50, 
which is calculated as unpaid rent from September of 2005 through December of 2006 in 
the amount of $88,000.00, and costs in the amount of $174.50. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Appellee, Ray, is an individual who resides in Uintah County, State of Utah. 
Appellant, PRS LLC, is a Utah Limited Liability Company engaged in the business of 
maintenance, construction, handling, restoration, repairs, purchase and sale of oil field 
production equipment and other related activities. (R. 1; R. 720). 
1
 PRS LLC's restatement of the facts is primarily necessitated by inaccuracies 
contained in Ray's "Statement of Facts". At page 8 of Ray's Brief, Ray claims that 
"uncontested facts" were deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This assertion is incorrect. The bulk of Ray's supposed "uncontested 
facts" were refuted by PRS LLC's Memorandum In Opposition to Summary Judgment 
(R. 251-279) which did not rely on mere denials but rather the accompanying Exhibits. 
See also Footnote 7 for additional argument on this point. Furthermore, the Trial Court's 
ruling does not reflect Ray's position that the alleged "uncontested facts" were deemed 
admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3). See R. 340-343. 
Likewise on page 11 of Ray's Brief it is asserted that "facts presented to the Trial 
Court in Ray's Damages Motion..were unopposed by PRS LLC below." In actuality, 
many of the alleged facts were vigorously debated by the parties. (R. 744-768; R. 784-
793). 
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Ray and Marilyn Hunting are the owners of the real property known as 5500 East 
5750 South, Vernal, Uintah County, State of Utah (hereinafter "Premises"), consisting of 
approximately 20.5 acres of land. (R. 1). 
On December 19, 1991, the parties entered into a written lease agreement for the 
purpose of reducing their prior verbal lease agreement to writing wherein Huntings are 
named "Owner" and PRS Corporation is named "Tenant." (R. 182-186, 192-193; R. 719-
720). At the time of the initiation of the lease, the leasehold originally furnished by Ray 
consisted of the shell of the main warehouse building and farmland. (R. 756-768). The 
Lease Agreement has a term of fifty (50) years. (R. 192-193; R. 384-388). PRS 
Corporation currently occupies, and has continuously occupied the Premises since the mid 
1980s. (R. 382-388). In reliance upon the 50 year term of the lease PRS Corporation has 
made substantial improvements to the Premises. (R. 382-388). 
At no time during the more than twenty year period that PRS Corporation has 
occupied the Premises pursuant to the lease agreement has it breached the terms of either 
the verbal lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement. (R. 184; R. 252; R. 872 p. 9). 
At no previous time has Ray initiated litigation to challenge the validity of either the 
verbal lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement or any of the terms thereof. (R. 
184; R. 252). Ray has received, each and every month, the agreed upon sum of $2,000.00 
outlined in the Agreement. (R. 182-200, R.371-388 at 8;) (R.371-388; 755-768). 
In 2004 PRS Corporation created additional business entities to better serve its 
growing needs. One such entity was PRS LLC. (R. 872 p. 5; R. 382-388; R. 755-768). 
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The limited liability company served as a managerial entity overseeing the day-to-day 
needs of the various business entities' operations. Accordingly, it paid many of the 
corporations' bills including rent to Ray. (R. 719-721). For approximately 18 months 
said practice continued without objection from the Ray. (R. 872 pp. 5-6; R. 755-768). 
No notice for failure to pay rent or inquiry as to why the check came from "Pipe Renewal 
Service, LLC" rather than "Pipe Renewal Service, Inc." was ever sent. (R. 872 p. 7). 
Then on August 15, 2005, Ray sent PRS LLC a notice of rent increase. (R. 6). The notice 
stated that Ray knew not with whom he dealt, that he had no contract with PRS LLC, and 
that monthly rent was increased from $2,000.00 to $7,500.00 per month (R. 6). See 
generally R. 755-768. 
During the course of the proceedings, Ray motioned the trial court for summary 
judgment. (R. 138-140). In defense, PRS LLC submitted the lease agreement between 
Ray and PRS Corp and asserted that the right of possession properly flowed from the 
tenant - not Ray. (R. 251-279). However, the trial court concluded that PRS LLC had 
not responded by affidavit and that it was therefore justified in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Ray, but it reserved the issue of damages for a later hearing. (R. 
340-343). 
In response to the Trial Court's ruling, the PRS LLC filed a motion for 
reconsideration on several grounds. (R. 369-370). One such reason was that Ray failed to 
join the PRS Corporation as a necessary party. (R. 377). The LLC also urged the court to 
modify its ruling on the basis that the lease agreement meet the requirements for a self-
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authenticating document under Rule 902(8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 373-374). 
After the parties were given an opportunity to appropriately brief the issues, the Trial 
Court entered a ruling in which it set the motion for a hearing and stated "the Court is 
prepared to order PRS, Inc. be joined, and that it would do so unless "the parties can 
adequately explain why PRS, Inc. should not be joined". (R. 577-580). At the hearing 
PRS LLC asserted that PRS Corporation and others were necessary parties. (R. 872 p. 5, 
p. 11). The Plaintiff asserted that PRS LLC was the only necessary party and presented 
four cases, for the first time at the hearing, which Ray believed supported this assertion. 
(R. 872 p. 15). 
With only a brief opportunity to glance over the cases during the hearing PRS LLC 
asserted that all four cases were inapplicable as they dealt with situations where the 
additional parties entered the premises after the defendant had been served with the three 
day notice. (R. 872 pp. 27-28). The court took the issue under advisement and ultimately 
sided with PRS LLC on this issue. (R. 594-599). In its Ruling, the Trial Court 
distinguished Ray's cases and stated that the "Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is 
not a necessary party." (Id.) (Feb 1st Ruling). Nevertheless, still the Court did not join 
the Corporation as a party nor did it require Ray to amend his complaint. (Id.) 
The issue of damages remained outstanding, but the issue of eviction had become 
moot by Ray's own admission as the PRS LLC had vacated the property. The Court 
refused to enter an order of restitution on the basis that it would adversely affect the rights 
of at least two other business entities who were occupying the property, but who had not 
-9-
been made a party to any preceding. (Id.) After entertaining three additional motions the 
court entered a final judgment in favor of Ray in the total sum of $88,174.50, which was 
calculated as unpaid rent from September of 2005 through December of 2006 in the 
amount of $88,000.00, and costs in the amount of $174.50. (R. 819-822). 
The Trial Court held that Ray suffered no actual damages and that based on 
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), that the Plaintiff was not entitled to treble 
damages. The Court stated the following, as set forth in the record, as the basis therefore: 
"ON THIS POINT, THE COURT IS PERSUADED BY PERKINS V. SPENCER, 
243 P.2d 446 (UTAH 1952) WHICH CLEARLY ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER TREBLE DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE 
APPROPRIATE WHEN A NON-PARTY TO THE SUIT ENJOYS POSSESSION 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. WHILE THE CASES ARE 
DISTINGUISHABLE ON SOME FACTUAL POINTS, THE FACT OF THE 
MATTER REMAINS THAT "SO LONG AS [PRS, INC.] REMAINED IN 
POSSESSION, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW [MR. HUNTING] COULD BE 
DAMAGED BY THE FACT THAT [PRS LLC] REMAINED THERE. EVEN IF 
[THE LLC] HAD MOVED, [MR. HUNTING] WOULD HAVE NO RIGHT OF 
POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES AS AGAINST [THE CORPORATION]. 
[MR. HUNTING], THEREFORE, SUFFERED NO ACTUAL DAMAGE." SEE 
Id. AT 449." (R. 819-820). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT ON PRS LLC'S APPEAL 
In his Brief, Ray argues that PRS Corporation and other business entities 
occupying the leasehold are not necessary parties. Ray's assertion is based on Holmes 
Development, LLC v. Cook, and is accompanied by an attempt to discredit and disregard a 
portion of the record below by unilaterally declaring PRS LLC's evidence as 
incompetent. Ray also seeks to modify the Trial Courts ruling and declare PRS 
Corporation's lease abandoned. Finally, Ray argues that the Court should consider PRS 
LLC's appeal pursuant to an older version of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. 
In reply, PRS LLC asserts that Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook is completely 
irrelevant to these facts when considering the question of joinder. PRS LLC notes that 
Ray also repeatedly urged the Trial Court to declare PRS Corporation's lease abandoned, 
but the Trial Court expressly refused to do so in several of its rulings. This issue was not 
appealed and is therefore moot. All attempts to interject an assumption that the lease was 
abandoned should not be well taken. PRS LLC also asserts that both versions of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 mandate the joinder of PRS Corporation. 
PRS LLC asserts that allowing Ray to maintain an action for unlawful detainer 
without necessary parties constitutes a revision of Utah's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act 
and a violation of Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On the issue of summary 
judgment, the evidence submitted clearly demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as 
-11-
to whether Ray could properly maintain an action pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-36-7. Ray should not be allowed to shop for the weakest defendant, circumvent 
Rule 19 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7, and improperly recover theoretical damages 
when suffering no actual damages. 
B. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPELLANT RAY HUNTING'S 
APPEAL 
The Trial Court properly denied treble damages. The Trial Court expressly ruled 
that Ray suffered no actual damage. Therefore, PRS LLC submits that the Trial Court 
ruling implies that there are no damage amounts to treble. However, as is argued in PRS 
LLC's Brief of Appellant, the Trial Court's attempt to grant $88,000.00 as rent rather 
than damages is clearly improper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10. 
PRS LLC acknowledges that the Trial Court's failure to require adherence to Rule 
19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limited its ability to properly rule on the issue of 
damages. PRS LLC agrees with Ray's assertions that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 
mandates treble damages when a defendant is found to be in unlawful detainer. However, 
PRS LLC argues that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 should never become applicable 
unless and until proper parties are joined pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in addition to those parties necessary to maintain an action for unlawful 
detainer pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. 
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Utah's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act seeks to safeguard property rights and is 
not aimed at generating theoretical damage income for landlords. Inasmuch as the Trial 
Court properly concluded that Ray suffered no actual damages, it is nonsensical to award 
treble damages on legal theory. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
WITHOUT NECESSARY PARTIES WOULD CONSTITUTE A REVISION OF UTAH'S 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACT AND A VIOLATION OF RULE 19 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. PRS Corporation and other business entities occupying the leasehold 
are clearly necessary parties 
In response to PRS LLC's Brief which outlined applicable Utah law mandating the 
joinder of PRS Corporation and other entities, Ray responded with three basic arguments. 
First, he asserts that the Court should consider the 2005 version of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-36-7, and that this pre-2007 Utah Code better supports his position. Next, it is argued 
that the issue of joinder was not properly preserved for an appeal. Finally, Ray suggests 
that no evidence was submitted indicating the presence of other persons or entities 
occupying the property. 
To the argument that the Court should consider the appeal in light of the 2005 
version of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7, PRS LLC will acquiesce. This statute was the 
governing law when the case was initiated, and better supports PRS LLC's contentions 
anyway. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 (1993) mandates that tenant and subtenants "in 
actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party 
defendant in the proceeding". UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7(1). Thus, it is clear that 
tenants and subtenants occupying the property when the action is commenced are 
mandatory parties to the action. Furthermore, Rule 19 states that those parties in whose 
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"absence complete relief cannot be accorded" must be joined. Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 
19(a). Said Rule also dictates who is responsible for the mandated joinder, by stating 
that the "Pleader", here Ray, shall either join all parties necessary for complete relief2 or 
it "shall state" the names of those parties not joined and "state[d] the reasons why they are 
not joined." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 19(c). Ray has not followed the Statute or the Rule in 
this matter. 
Second, attempting to deflect PRS LLC's joinder claims, Ray argues that the issue 
of joinder was not properly preserved for an appeal. Preservation of an issue for appeal 
2
 Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10, complete relief in an unlawful detainer 
action "shall include an order for the restitution of the premises." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-36-10(1). In the current case, the Trial Court properly held that it would not 
adjudicate the rights of persons or entities in occupation of the premises who were not 
parties to the litigation, and therefore refused to issue an order of restitution. (R. 595; R. 
817-822,820). 
In fact, in its July 2, 2007 Ruling the Trial Court expressly stated that: 
"First, there is no question that even if the Defendant had vacated the premises 
after receiving the Plaintiffs three-day notice to pay or vacate (or at any time 
thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in a position to restore 
possession of the subject property to the Plaintiff (R. 820-821). 
This July 2nd Ruling echoed previous rulings by the Trial Court. For example, in 
its February 1st Ruling, the Trial Court stated: 
"...the Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is not a necessary party to this 
suit, insofar as it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and 
obtain full possession of the subject property." (R. 597) 
Thus, it is implicit in the Trial Courts own rulings that Ray did not join necessary 
parties. However, for some reason, Ray was allowed to proceed with the litigation. As a 
result, the relationship between PRS Corporation and Ray was never considered by the 
Court, and PRS LLC was left with $88,000.00 in rent it did not owe. 
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is based on whether the issue was disclosed to the trier and whether the trial court was on 
notice of the issue raised on appeal. Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc, 2004 99 P.3d 801, 
507 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT 72. When the issue on appeal is raised before the trial 
court, and when the Trial Court has entered rulings on the matter, the issue is preserved. 
Ellis v. Swensen, 2000, 16 P.3d 1233, 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2000 UT 101. Here, 
joinder was a central issue for nearly eight months of the litigation below. 
Nevertheless, in Ray's Brief at footnote 6, page 15, there is an elaborate attempt to 
discredit eight months of record on the issue.3 Attempting to discredit sources, raising the 
issue of joinder, Ray proclaims that trial court rulings on the issue cannot preserve issues 
for appeal but cites no legal authority. Ray also tries to implement a strange six month 
rule a rule, but again cites no legal authority. Footnote 6 also contains inaccuracies 
concerning the record. For example, it proclaims that PRS LLC's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Reconsider contains no mention of joinder. However, pages 10-11 
3
 PRS LLC has not requested the Court's Record as was done by Ray and perhaps 
there are some discrepancies between the record numbers allocated in the record index 
and the actual numbers on the Court's file. Nevertheless, the record is saturated with both 
argument and rulings on the issue of proper parties to this action. Some of the more 
notable of which are the following: 
A. PRS LLC's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider (R. 
427-495) 
B. Ruling dated 1/08/07. (R. 577-580). 
C. The entirety of Transcript of Oral Argument on January 30, 2007. (R. 872) 
D. Ruling dated 2/02/07. (R. 594-599). 
E. PRS LLC's Memorandum In Support of Summary Judgment on Issue of 
Damages. (R. 602-607). 
F. PRS LLC's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Award Final 
Damages. (R. 744-768). 
G. Ruling dated 7/2/07. (R. 817-822). 
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contain said argument under the heading "The obligation to join PRS Corporation to this 
litigation firmly rests with the Plaintiff and is only fatal to his case." (R. 482 based on the 
record index). 
PRS LLC can articulate a litany of additional flaws with Ray's assertion that the 
issue of joinder wras not properly raised. However, the record is so clear concerning 
joinder that belaboring the point is unnecessary. The apparent goal of Ray's argument 
concerning the issue of joinder is to have the Court review the issue with a correction of 
error "standard of review". PRS LLC believes that a correction of error review is 
actually more favorable to its appeal on this issue, but in sincerity must maintain that the 
issue was properly preserved belowr. 
B. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook is completely irrelevant to the facts 
of this appeal. 
Ray has continually argued that Holmes should be outcome determinative in this 
case. However, Holmes stands for the proposition that one who is not a party to the 
contract cannot assert the rights of that contract. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 
P.3d 895 (Utah 2002). Defendant agrees with this statement of law, but argues it is 
wholly irrelevant and inapplicable to the case at hand. PRS LLC asserts no rights under 
the Lease Agreement. Rather, PRS LLC argues that the lease agreement is evidence, 
which was properly before the Trial Court, that indicates Ray cannot properly maintain an 
action solely against PRS LLC pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 (1993). The 
lease agreement is merely evidence that Ray currently does not enjoy right of possession 
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to the leasehold, and that proper parties have not been joined pursuant to Utah's Forcible 
Entry and Detainer Act.4 
As is previously stated, the Trial Court's rulings essentially hold that proper parties 
were not joined. In the Trial Court's final ruling it stated "there is no question that even if 
the Defendant had vacated the premises after receiving the Plaintiffs three-day notice to 
pay or vacate (or at any time thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in 
a position to restore possession of the subject property to the Plaintiff." (R. 820-821). If 
PRS LLC were attempting to assert rights under the lease agreement then Holmes would 
be applicable, but PRS LLC has long asserted that "Pipe Renewal Service, LLC occupies 
the premises at the whim and by permission of the Lessee, PRS Corporation." (R. 480). 
C. The Trial Court expressly refused to declare PRS Corporation's lease 
abandoned, and this issue is not properly before the Court of Appeals. 
Ray's brief repeatedly attempts to insert the presumption that the lease was 
abandoned. However, the Trial Court expressly refused to presume the lease was 
abandoned and stated: 
"The Plaintiff urges the Court to presume that PRS, Inc. had abandoned the lease... 
The Court will not presume that PRS, Inc. abandoned the lease without having 
PRS, Inc. as a party to the suit. Therefor j , the presumption of abandonment will 
not be entertained, or relied upon, by the Court." (R. 820). 
4
 Ray's argument on Holmes consistency ignores the fact that regardless of 
whether contract law allows the lease agreement to be used for anything by any third 
party, it may nevertheless be very relevant evidence in determining whether a plaintiff has 
properly joined all necessary parties required to maintain an action pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-36-7. 
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This ruling was not appealed 5 and is therefore not properly before the Court. The issue 
of abandonment is therefore moot. All attempts to interject an assumption that the lease 
was abandoned should not be well taken .6 
D. Ray's position on the issue of joinder constitutes a revision of Utah's 
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act and Violates Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 
If Ray is allowed to properly maintain this action for unlawful detainer without 
joining other parties, this Court's ruling will effectively constitute a revision of Utah's 
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act and Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
change will mean a landlord whose premises are sublet will be able to sue a subtenant of 
his or her choosing with the knowledge that even though he will not be entitled to 
restitution of the property, damages for unlawful detainer may be obtained if the tenant 
does not elect to intervene. 
5
 PRS LLC notes that the issue of abandonment is not mentioned anywhere in 
Ray's Docketing Statement or as an issue in the Brief of Cross-Appellant. 
6
 Likewise, Ray attempts to interject an incorrect assumption concerning payments 
of rent. In at least footnotes 7, 12, 13, and 20, Ray argues that rent was not paid by PRS 
Corporation. This is incorrect and at odds with the record. Rent was paid by PRS 
Corporation, but in 2005 it was decided that Ray did not like the name on the checks. In 
footnote 7 Ray somewhat recognizes the fact that he received the $2,000 monthly rental 
payment, required pursuant to the lease agreement, but just wants to apply it to whichever 
entity best serves the current legal ambitions. Nothing in the lease agreement gives Ray a 
right to demand a check from any specific entity or person. Furthermore, this issue relates 
to the question of abandonment which is not before this Court at this time. 
The record below, including argument from counsel in nearly every memorandum 
(R. 182-200, R. 371-388 at 8), and the testimony in two affidavits (R.371-388; 755-768) is 
that the correct amount of rent, $2,000, was paid each and every month. 
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Here, Ray was aware that the lease agreement only named PRS Corporation. 
Therefore, PRS LLC being the weaker defendant was sued. When PRS Corporation did 
not intervene it was simply argued that Holmes was controlling and that the lease 
agreement could not be considered for any puipose. However, as has been argued, both 
the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure guard against this type of 
"defendant shopping." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 states that those in possession at the 
time the case was initiated must be joined. U TAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 states complete 
relief in an unlawful detainer action must include an order of restitution. Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that necessary parties for complete relief must be 
joined, and puts the obligation on the plaintiff to accomplish the joinder. Adherence to 
these rules and statutes is necessary in order to prevent injustice, and Ray should be 
required to adhere to the same. 
II. THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, WHEN CONSIDERED WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S OWN 
RULINGS, CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF COULD PROPERLY MAINTAIN AN ACTION PURSUANT 
TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 
Ray's Brief effectively exhausts seven pages of argument on the single assertion 
that PRS LLC did not introduce any admissible evidence of material fact.7 This assertion 
7
 Ray's brief cites several cases which are believed to make this point. However, 
cases such as Busch Corp. VState Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 
1987), Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25 f 12, 156 P.3d 175, and Poteet v. White, 
2006 UT 63, f 7, 147 P.3d 439 are all distinguishable from the case now before the Court. 
These cases all involved situations where the non-moving party relied solely on denials. 
In the case now before the Court, PRS LLC did not rely on mere denials, but 
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is clearly incorrect. Indeed, the Court's original stated basis for the granting of Ray's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was that "the Defendant has not responded by affidavit." 
(R. 342). The Trial Court made this ruling despite the fact that the lease agreement was 
used as the support for the denials in PRS LLC's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment and was submitted concurrently therewith. (R. 251-279). The Trial 
Courts' ruling does not adhere to Rule 902 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which state that 
acknowledged documents are self-authenticating. Rule 902, in relevant part, states: 
u(8) Acknowledged Documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate 
of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary 
public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments." UTAH 
R. EVID. 902(8). 
The 1991 Lease Agreement contains a certificate of acknowledgment, the mark of 
the notary public, and was executed by Ray who is a party to this litigation.8 Ray now 
supported those denials with a lease agreement signed by the moving party before a 
notary. 
For the same reasons, PRS LLC disagrees with Ray's extensive argument on Rule 
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A review of PRS LLC's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Summary Judgment reveals that nearly every factual allegation was 
denied on the basis of the lease agreement, and said lease agreement was attached thereto 
as Exhibit A. (R. 251-279). It makes no sense to submit an affidavit alleging a lease 
agreement, when you can submit the actual agreement which is signed by the moving 
party in front of the notary. The same as the affidavit would be. On this basis the actual 
notarized agreement was submitted as the basis for the denials. The lease agreement 
complies with Rule 7(c)(3)'s requirement that allegations not be merely denied. 
Therefore, the entirety of footnotes 15, 16, and 17 should not be well taken. 
8
 In footnote 21 of Ray's Brief it is alleged that Ray was not on notice of the lease 
agreement. Given the fact that Ray is a party to the lease agreement this is clearly not the 
case. (R. 251-279) The lease agreement was included in discovery. Furthermore, the 
affirmative defense of estoppel is raised in PRS LLC's Answer. The Third Defense in 
Defendant's Answer to the Amended Complaint states, uRay Hunting's claims are barred 
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argues that the Court did not exclude the lease agreement, that it was considered, but that 
the Trial Court believed the lease agreement insignificant to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. Brief of Appellee at 26. 
However, PRS LLC respectfully submits that the Utah Legislature made the lease 
agreement a genuine issue of material fact when it passed UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7(1) 
mandating the joinder of all parties in possession of the premises when the action is 
commenced. Utah Courts have also made the issue of evidence suggesting parties in 
possession to be a material fact by holding that if the object of the action is to recover 
possession or use of property, then parties who are in possession and claim an interest in 
the property are necessary and indispensable parties to the action.9 Bonneville Tower 
Condominium Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, Inc., 728 P.2d 
1017(1986). 
Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 
by the doctrine of estoppel." The Lease Agreement supplies the factual basis for this 
defense. 
9
 On page 22 of Ray's Brief he makes a futile attempt to distinguish Bonneville 
from the case now before the Court. Essentially, Ray argues that Bonneville only 
involved an action to recover possession of property, and that because Bonneville was not 
an unlawful detainer action seeking to recover possession of property it is "easily 
distinguishable." This argument completely disregards the holding. Bonneville stands for 
the simple proposition that if the object of the action is to recover possession or use of 
property, then parties who are in possession and claim an interest in the property are 
necessary and indispensable parties. Id. Ray's initial action sought to recover the 
possession and use of the property. Ray now seems to shy away from these requests 
which is futile given that it is mandated by statute. 
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56(c). The court is to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Additionally, the summary judgment rule permits excursions even beyond the 
pleading. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 353 P.2d 168 (Utah 1960). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7(1) (1992) makes evidence concerning additional 
individuals/entities occupying the premises material. 
Therefore, if the Trial Court could have reasonably concluded from the lease 
agreement that other parties were occupying the premises when the action was 
commenced, summary judgment should have been denied.10 Yet, ironically the Trial 
Court essentially made findings that additional parties were and had been in possession of 
the premises, but nevertheless granted summary judgment.11 PRS LLC also notes that 
10
 Summary judgment should be granted only if pleadings, depositions, admissions, 
and affidavits, if any, show without dispute that the party seeking summary judgment is 
entitled to prevail. Gilmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d 426 (1964). Summary judgment is a 
drastic remedy and should be granted with reluctance. Housley v. Anaconda Co, All P.2d 
390 (Utah 1967). The Court is to consider the situation in a light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. Miller v. Celebration Mining Co., 29 P.3d 1231 (Utah 2001). 
11
 Some of the more concise rulings on this issue are the following: 
"In fact, both parties, to some extent, have relied upon the existence of PRS, Inc." 
(R.579) 
"Having reviewed the records, and according ro the pleadings submitted by both 
parties, the Court believes that there are third parties which have not been made 
part of this lawsuit, but which have rights related to the underlying property." 
(R.580). 
"First, there is no question that even if the Defendant had vacated the premises 
after receiving the Plaintiffs three-day notice to pay or vacate (or at any time 
thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in a position to restore 
possession of the subject property to the Plaintiff (R. 820-821). 
-23-
subsequent to the Trial Court's ruling on summary judgment, two separate affidavits were 
also submitted by corporate officers attesting to the duration of PRS Corporation's 
occupancy of the leasehold and of the relationship between PRS LLC and PRS 
Corporation. (R.371-388; 755-768).12 PRS LLC submits that a sufficient showing of 
evidence displaying Ray's action could not be properly maintained, was made and should 
have prevented a ruling on summary judgment. On this basis, and not those urged by 
Ray's Brief, PRS LLC respectfully requests that the Court overturn the Trial Court's 
ruling in order to provide PRS LLC with an opportunity for a trial where it can subpoena 
appropriate witness. 
III. PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SHOP FOR THE WEAKEST DEFENDANT, 
CIRCUMVENT RULE 19 AND UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7, AND IMPROPERLY 
RECOVER THEORETICAL DAMAGES. 
A. A Plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action should not be allowed to 
recover treble damages if there are no actual damages. 
"...the Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is not a necessary party to this 
suit, insofar as it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and 
obtain full possession of the subject property." (R. 597). 
12
 PRS LLC sincerely apologizes to the Court for citing, at times, a document 
rather than an exact page. However, as has been previously noted, PRS LLC has not had 
the opportunity to examine the Court's record as was done by Ray. In its initial Brief, 
PRS LLC cited to the record by using the document page number and the record index. 
Ray's Brief suggests that some of the cites to the record are incorrect. PRS LLC has 
noted, using Ray's Addendum, that at least the Trial Court's July 2, 2007 Ruling is 
numbered in reverse order. These errors make it essentially impossible to pinpoint cite 
from the record index. 
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On page 35 of Ray's Brief counsel makes a "slippery slope" argument that has no 
apparent application to this case. Essentially it is argued, that if a landlord seeking to 
recover damages for his loss of use and enjoyment of property is required to actually have 
a right to the use and enjoyment of that same property, then a tenant could "litigate and 
vacate." This argument displays a complete misunderstanding of the issue13 now before 
the Court. PRS LLC agrees that if the landlord had a right to the property at issue it 
would not matter under the Unlawful Detainer statute whether the tenant stayed or left 
just before final judgment-the tenant would and should be liable for the landlord's 
damages just the same. 
However, the issue concerning damages now before the Court is an entirely 
different one. The Trial Court correctly held that Ray suffered no actual damages. The 
question is, should Courts award treble damages while recognizing that there were no 
actual damages just because the statute says so?" No. In actuality the statute does not 
require damages in this instance, as Ray should not have been allowed to maintain the 
action without complying with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. Perkins v. Spencer, 243 
P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), is the most similar case to the one at hand, and is the case relied on 
by the Trial Court in its ruling on damages. 
13
 Ray's Brief states that PRS LLC's reading of the statute "require[s] an order of 
restitution as a prerequisite to the entry of an award for damages." Brief of Appellee at 
35. This is simply an incorrect recital of PRS LLC's position. Really, the "order of 
restitution" is irrelevant. What is important is that the landlord has a right to the 
possession and use of the property and thus suffers actual damages. PRS LLC's position 
is ironically identical to the Trial Court's position on this point, in that Ray suffered no 
actual damages. Therefore, what is fair and just about awarding damages? 
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Ray argued before the Trial Court that Perkins had no relevance to the current case 
because of minor factual differences. These arguments were ultimately rejected, but are 
now repeated nearly verbatim in Ray's Brief on pages 35 and 36. To these arguments the 
Trial Court ruled as follows: 
"On this point, the Court is persuaded by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 
1952), which (contrary to the Plaintiffs reply memorandum at 8) very clearly 
addresses the issue of whether treble damages for unlawful detainer are 
appropriate when a non-party to the suit enjoys possession of the subject property. 
While the cases are distinguishable on some factual points, the fact of the matter 
remains that so long as [PRS, Inc.] remained in possession, it is difficult to see 
how [Mr. Hunting] could be damaged by that fact that [PRS, LLC] remained there. 
Even if [the LLC] had moved, [Mr. Hunting] would have had no right to 
possession of the premises as against [the Corporation]. [Mr. Hunting], therefore, 
suffered no actual damage." (R. 817-822). 
PRS LLC believes the Trial Court's succinct dismissal of Ray's arguments is 
sufficient to state the obvious. As a side argument, Ray again14 urges the Court to 
presume the lease abandoned15 even though this issue was not appealed. As previously 
14
 See pages 18-19 for additional argument on this topic. 
15
 Again Ray's counsel makes an elaborate attempt to discredit the record on an 
issue not appealed. The chosen method for discrediting the record is to state that 
information presented to the Trial Court at the oral argument does not count, and that the 
affidavits do not count. See footnote 30 of Appellee Brief. The criticisms of the 
affidavits ignore paragraph seven of William Lauf s reconsideration affidavit which 
states: 
"The Corporation is authorized by the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "A") to allow the 
LLC to conduct business at the lease premises, and the LLC is authorized by the 
Corporation to conduct business at the leased premises. (R. 377) [emphasis 
added]. 
After which Ray's counsel quotes paragraph 8 out of context, which states that 
PRS Corporation could terminate its agreements with PRS LLC and continue business as 
usual, and then asserts that this information somehow helps Ray's case. The inescapable 
facts are that the trier of fact evaluated the lease agreement, affidavits, and information 
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outlined, the trier of fact, the Honorable John R. Anderson, expressly refused to accept 
this argument. PRS LLC also notes that Ray has not submitted evidence to this effect 
because both sides know that the Corporation has and does occupy the property, and that 
"both parties, to some extent, have relied upon the existence of PRS, Inc." (R. 579). 
B. "Rent" v. "Damages" 
Footnote 29 of Ray's Brief argues that uthe 'rent' v. 'damages' dichotomy relied 
on by PRS LLC is irrelevant to the case at bar." Unfortunately, "in the case at bar", this 
is not true. PRS LLC agrees that if a defendant is found to be in unlawful detainer, rent 
constitutes damages. The problem is, the Trial Court's ruling does not seem to agree. In 
one instance the Trial Court states: 
"[Mr. Hunting], therefore, suffered no actual damage. See id. [sic] at 449. 
Therefore, on this basis, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs request for any treble 
damages in this matter " (R. 819). 
However, in the next instance, the Trial Court awards "$0.00 as treble damages" and 
"$88,000.00 as unpaid rent." (R. 819). 
Thus, the Trial Court seems to be saying the $88,000.00 awarded as "unpaid rent" 
is something other than damages. However, as is correctly argued by Ray, after a 
and refused to presume that the lease had been abandoned. 
In fact, the Trial Court's January ruling expressly stated that "having reviewed the 
records, and according to the pleadings submitted by both parties, the Court believes that 
there are third parties which have not been made part of this lawsuit, but which have 
rights related to the underlying property." (R. 580). Later the Trial Court also notes that 
"In fact, both parties, to some extent, have relied upon the existence of PRS, Inc." (R. 
579). This was not appealed. 
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defendant is found to be in unlawful detainer, there can be nothing but damages. Either 
there are no damages and nothing to treble, or amounts awarded should be trebled 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. This case is an example of the former. 
PRS LLC argues that the Trial Court's January 8th (R.577-580), February 2nd 
(R.594-599), and July 2nd (R.817-822) Rulings effectively constitute findings that PRS 
Corporation and other entities occupy the property. If others occupy the property how can 
Ray nevertheless be entitled to rent the same property? If Ray could not re-let the subject 
property, he also should not be entitled to $88,000.00 in "unpaid rent." 
However, rather than requesting that the Trial Court make findings to support its 
awards, Ray would have the Appellate Court usurp the trial judge's role as trier of fact. 
This is so because Ray does not ask the Appellate Court to remand the case and instruct 
the Trial Court to change its rulings on the topic. Rather, Ray asks the Appellate Court to 
find that no one occupied the subject property, and that the lease between Ray and PRS 
Corporation was abandoned. Ray would then have the Court award treble damages based 
on its own findings. 
PRS LLC agrees that the dichotomy between rent and damages should not matter. 
However, based on the Trial Court's rulings, this distinction does matter. As the Trial 





RAY HUNTING'S APPEAL 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED NO 
ACTUAL DAMAGES, AND IMPLIEDLY RULED THAT THERE ARE NO DAMAGE 
AMOUNTS TO TREBLE 
A. The Trial Court properly denied treble damages but improperly 
awarded Ray a judgment of $88,000.00. 
The Trial Court properly denied treble damages. The Trial Court expressly ruled 
that Ray suffered no actual damage.16 Therefore, PRS LLC submits that the Trial Court 
impliedly ruled that there are no damage amounts to treble. However, as is argued supra 
in PRS LLC's Brief of Appellant, the Trial Court's attempt to grant $88,000.00 as rent 
rather than damages is clearly improper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10. 
B. Treble damages are not proper because PRS Inc. is in possession and 
was not joined as a party. 
PRS LLC does not dispute that Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 mandates treble 
damages in appropriate circumstances where damages are properly awarded. However, in 
this case, as previously argued, the Court properly ruled that there were no actual 
damages because there are other parties, including the tenant (PRS Inc.) under a written 
lease agreement, in possession of the premises.17 Thus, following Perkins, supra, the_ 
16
 The Trial Court in its July 2, 2007, Ruling (R.817-822) found that Ray "suffered 
no actual damage/' See page 4 of the Ruling (R.820). The Court's finding was based on 
the fact that Ray did not have a right to possess the premises because there were other 
non-parties in actual possession, including PRS Inc. who is a tenant under a written lease 
agreement. On that basis the Trial Court stated, 'Therefore, on this basis, the court 
hereby denies Plaintiffs request for any treble damages in this matter. See Id. 
17
 PRS LLC reiterates the fact that the Trial Court found that there are others in 
possession of the premises, including the Tenant (PRS Inc.) under a written lease 
agreement. In the Trial Court's January 8, 2007, Ruling (R.577-580), the Trial Court 
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specifically found and acknowledged the lease agreement and the presence of PRS Inc. on 
the premises when it stated: 
Having reviewed the records, and according to the pleadings submitted by 
both parties, the Court believes that there are third parties which have not 
been made a part of this lawsuit, but which have rights related to the 
underlying property. In particular, the Court is aware that there is a lease 
between the Plaintiff and [PRS Inc.], which lease was the crux of the 
Defendant's motion to dismiss and opposition to the Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment. In fact, both parties, to some extent, have relied upon 
the existence of PRS, Inc. in arguing their positions.. . . Therefore, the 
Court is reluctant to issue an order at this time restoring possession of the 
subject property to the Plaintiff. 
The Court is puzzled as to why these other parties (particularly PRS, 
Inc.) have not been made part of this lawsuit. It would appear that the 
Plaintiff is seeking to regain exclusive possession of the subject property, 
yet the Plaintiff has failed to join at lease one seemingly necessary party. 
See R.577-78. 
The Court again found in its February 2, 2007, Ruling (R.594-599), that the Tenant 
(PRS Inc.), under a written lease agreement, and others, are in possession of the premises 
when it stated: 
However, in this case, there are other parties presently in possession of 
the subject property whose rights have not yet been adjudicated. At least 
one the these parties has entered into a lease agreement with the Plaintiff. 
See R.595. (Emphasis added.) 
The Trial Court further stated in the February 2, 2007, Ruling, as follows: 
The Court instructed the parties to prepare to address the issue of joining 
other seeming necessary parties to this lawsuit. Having review (sic.) the 
argument of the parties and the applicable law, the Court is still not 
convinced that PRS, Inc. is not a necessary party to this suit, insofar as 
it ippears to the Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and obtain full 
possession of the subject property. In granting Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment, the Court had only adjudicated the rights between Ray 
Hunting and PRS, LLC. However, as stated above, an adjudication of those 
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Trial Court properly found that there were no actual damages and nothing to treble. 
C. Reasonableness of damages argument is unavailing. 
Ray's extensive argument on the issue of reasonable damages is unavailing in light 
of the Trial Court's ruling that there are no actual damages. The question of 
reasonableness of damages is not before this court. In deed, the Trial Court, not the Court 
of Appeals, is the proper forum for an argument as to reasonableness of damages. 
Before the question of reasonable damages comes into play, Ray needs to first 
convince this Court that it should ignore Perkins and hold that the Trial Court erred when 
it failed to rule that there are actual damages, other than nominal, that should be awarded 
despite that fact that the Trial Court also found that there is a Tenant (PRS Inc.) in 
possession under a written lease agreement who was not joined to this lawsuit as 
specifically required by Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7 and Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Only after that hurdle is crossed can the Trial Court make a determination as 
to reasonableness of damages. Thus, any argument on that issue before this Court should 
not be well taken. 
rights does not allow the Court to restore complete possession of the subject 
property to the Plaintiff. It is clear to the Court that there exists a lease 
between PRS, Inc . . . . and the Plaintiff. The rights and obligations that 
flow from that lease agreement have not been adjudicated at this time. It 
appears that [PRS, Inc.] and PRS Holdings, Inc. have been in 
possession of the subject property this entire time. Yet none of those 
parties have been brought within the jurisdiction of this Court through 
service of process or appearance in the matter. 
See R.596. (Emphasis added.) 
-31-
D. Pearce v. Shurtz, Tanner v. Lawler, and Pickney v. Snideman do not 
support any proposition that Utah Code Ann. 78-36-7 does not require that 
PRS Inc. should have been joined to this lawsuit. 
Ray presents to this Court the cases of Pearce v. Shurtz, 270 P.2d 442 (Utah 1954), 
Tanner v. Lawler, 305 P.2d 882 (Utah 1957), and Pickney v. Snidmen, 2000 UT App. 275 
(unpublished memorandum decision), for the proposition that Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7 
does not required PRS Inc. to be joined to this lawsuit. Ray also argued these same cases 
before the Trial Court. See the Trial Court's Ruling attached as Exhibit "G" to the 
Addendum to Ray's Brief. The Trial Court properly distinguished these cases from the 
case at hand and properly determined that they do not support the proposition that Utah 
Code Ann. §78-36-7 does not require Ray to join PRS Inc. to this lawsuit.18 
18
 The Trial Court in its February 2, 2007, Ruling (R.594-599) distinguished the 
Tanner case from the case at hand because Tanner involved a third party not in 
possession who voluntarily intervened into the action. The Trial Court in it Ruling stated: 
Here, it appears to the Court that PRS entities (including PRS, LLC; [PRS 
Inc.]; and PRS Holdings, Inc.) have all enjoyed concurrent possession of the 
subject property and that only PRS, LLC's rights have been adjudicated at 
this time, the other parties not having been joined to the action. 
See R.596. 
The Trial Court also distinguished Pickney because that case involved a party who 
was in sole possession of the property as issue. The Trial Court stated: 
Here, there is ample reason to believe that PRS, LLC is not the sole party in 
possession of the subject property. The fact that PRS, LLC's name appears 
on the rent check does not, in and of itself make PRS, LLC the only tenant, 
especially in light of the lease agreement executed between the Plaintiff and 
PRS, Inc., which rights and obligations have not yet been adjudicated. 
See R.597. 
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By again arguing these cases before this Court after the Trial Court properly 
distinguished them, Ray is trying to have this Court believe that PRS Inc. was not in 
possession of the subject property despite the numerous findings of the Trial Court to the 
contrary. 
E. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 clearly mandates that PRS Inc. be joined as 
a party to this action. 
PRS LLC would like to point out to the Court that Ray, on footnote 35 in Ray's 
Brief, misquoted the 2005 version of Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7, by stating, "wherein the 
2005 version provides that no other person then the tenant and subtenant if there is one in 
possession "shall" be made a party to defendant in the proceeding."19 Ray's restatement 
of the statute as he did in footnote 35 confuses the meaning of the statute. Clearly this 
Finally, the Trial Court distinguished Pearce because a party who it was claimed 
was an indispensable party was not in possession of the subject property and because he 
previously assigned his interest in the subject property. The Trial Court stated: 
Because Lewelien was apparently not in possession of the property, it was 
not required that Lewelien be joined as a necessary party, and Pierce could 
lawfully proceed against Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson (i.e., the parties in 
possession). Here, as stated above, the Defendant and the other PRS 




 The text of the 2005 version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 is reproduced as 
Exhibit UA" to the Addendum to Ray's Brief, in pertinent part, as follows: 
No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is 
one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, 
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding . ... 
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statute in its original text mandates that PRS Inc., as a Tenant in possession, be made a 
party to this action. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO REQUIRE ADHERENCE TO RULE 19 LIMITED ITS 
ABILITY TO PROPERLY RULE ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES 
PRS LLC acknowledges that the Trial Court's failure to require adherence to Rule 
19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limited its ability to properly rule on the issue of 
damages. PRS LLC agrees with Ray's assertions that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 
mandates treble damages when a defendant is found to be in unlawful detainer. However, 
PRS LLC argues that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 should never become applicable 
unless and until proper parties are joined pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in addition to those parties necessary to maintain an action for unlawful 
detainer pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. 
III. UTAH'S FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACT SEEKS TO SAFEGUARD PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND IS NOT AIMED AT GENERATING THEORETICAL DAMAGE INCOME FOR 
LANDLORDS 
Utah's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act seeks to safeguard property rights and is 
not aimed at generating theoretical damage income for landlords. As stated supra, the 
Trial Court properly found that there are other entities in possession, including the tenant 
PRS Inc. under a written lease agreement, who have possessory interests. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-7 clearly intends to protect those interests by mandating the joining of these 
parties in an eviction action. These entities have not been joined nor have they entered 
appearances. Therefore, under Perkins, supra, there is no basis for any damages; and, it 
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was improper for the Court to impose a rent obligation on PRS LLC who was present 
with the permission of the tenant PRS Inc. 
As previously argued herein, to impose such an obligation in effect grants the 
landlord additional rent to which he is not entitled given the fact that he has already 
leased the premises to another entity (PRS Inc.) who is in possession and who is not a 
party to the suit. Because of the lease agreement, Ray cannot re-let the premises. How 
can Ray then be entitled to $88,000 in unpaid rent from PRS LLC who is not a party to 
the lease? Therefore, the Trial Court did err in granting judgment to Ray against PRS 
LLC for unpaid rent in the amount of $88,000 but properly concluded that there are no 
actual damages. 
Inasmuch as the Trial Court properly concluded that Ray suffered no actual 
damages, it is nonsensical to award treble damages on legal theory. As previously 
argued, the statute does not require damages in this instance, as Ray should not have been 
allowed to maintain the action without complying with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court must ultimately decide whether the Unlawful Detainer statute should be 
amended to allow a landlord to shop for the weakest defendant, by joining none of the 
other parties in possession of the subject property. This change will violate Rule 19 and 
circumvent UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. Such a change would allow landlords to 
effectively recover theoretical and/or punitive damages because in these instances there 
are no actual damages. 
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In the case at bar, the Landlord has no right to the possession and use of the 
property. However, Ray should not have been allowed to even maintain the action 
without complying with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure mandates that necessary parties for complete relief be joined, and puts the 
obligation on the plaintiff to accomplish the joinder. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
36-10, complete relief in an unlawful detainer action "shall include an order for the 
restitution of the premises." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(1). On this basis, the Trial 
Court's ruling on Summary Judgement in favor of Ray should be set aside, and the case 
should be remanded for dismissal or joinder of proper parties. 
The Trial Court correctly found that Ray suffered no actual damages. Therefore, 
only nominal damages, not "unpaid rent" should have been awarded. 
WHEREFORE, PRS LLC respectfully prays that the Utah Court of Appeals will: 
1. Reverse the Trial Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiff and remand the matter back to the Trial Court, 
instructing the Trial Court to consider PRS LLC's possession in light 
of the lease agreement and PRS Inc.'s right of possession thereunder. 
2. Remand the matter back to the Trial Court instructing the court to 
merge this case with Pipe Renewal Service Management, Inc. v Ray 
Hunting and Marilyn Hunting. Case No. 070800889, which is 
currently pending before Judge John R. Anderson, and which 
involves the same leasehold, parties, and lease agreement which are 
the subject of this appeal, and which arose out of this litigation. 
3. Reverse the Trial Court's determination that Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgement in the amount $88,174.50. 
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Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June, 2008. 
DANIEL S. SAM 
Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
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